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Abstract 
Calderon, S. (2019). True and False Intentions: A Mental Representational Approach. Department 
of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, PO Box 500, SE-405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden. 
 
The study of true and false intentions is a specific case of deception-detection research. The fo-
cus is on how to discriminate between lies and truths about future behavior, as opposed to pre-
vious deception research that focused almost exclusively on past behavior. The societal value 
of this research is great, since many legal settings demand that practitioners make credibility 
judgments of intentions. Here, the focus is specifically on the mental representations of lies and 
truths. The current thesis proposes and experimentally tests a theoretical model that suggests 
differences in the mental representation and communication of true and false intentions. It is 
based on research showing that psychologically distant tasks (e.g., unlikely tasks) are more ab-
stractly represented than psychologically proximal tasks (e.g., likely tasks). The purpose of this 
model is to help provide powerful predictions about how to differentiate between true and false 
intentions (e.g., generate novel cues to deceit) and to investigate the possibilities to apply con-
strual level theory to deception contexts. In brief, the model proposes that false intentions 
should be more abstractly represented than true intentions since they concern unlikely rather 
than likely future tasks. This difference should in turn be mirrored in language use. Four studies 
tested this. In Study I, participants were asked either to perform or not to perform (but to claim 
to perform in all cases) simple future tasks while construal level of the tasks was measured, us-
ing a behavior segmentation task (Exp. 1), and participants’ preference for abstract/concrete 
descriptions of the tasks (Exp. 2). Failing to support the prediction, liars’ and truth tellers’ con-
strual levels of the task did not differ. Study II again tested the prediction that false intentions 
are more abstractly represented than true intentions. Schema consistency (schema-consistent 
vs. schema-inconsistent tasks) was added as a manipulated factor to the tests in Study I. It was 
predicted that truth tellers would represent the future task, particularly for the schema-incon-
sistent task, in more concrete terms. Again, no between-group differences were found in level 
of construal of the task. A meta-analysis across the three experiments in Studies I and II showed 
an average effect size close to zero (Hedges’ g = 0.02). In Study III, it was tested whether false 
statements of intentions are more abstractly phrased than true statements of intentions. A com-
puterized content analysis of over 6,000 statements of true and false intentions—using two es-
tablished measures of linguistic abstraction—revealed no support for the predicted difference. 
In Study IV, two close replication experiments were conducted on the CLT finding at the core 
of the proposed construal level of intention (CLINT) model: that unlikely future events are 
more abstractly construed than likely ones. Both attempts failed to replicate this finding. In 
summary, the results of the thesis lend no support to the prediction that false intentions are 
represented at a higher, more abstract construal level than true intentions. A possible explana-
tion of the null findings is that the basic CLT assumption may not hold true. The thesis contrib-
utes to the burgeoning field of true and false intentions. It also adds to the research field of CLT. 
It makes a particularly valuable addition to the small number of studies investigating the effect 
of the subjective likelihood of future tasks on their construal level. 
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